Implications of Institutionalism for Democracy
Individuals cannot play a game without coming to a common understanding of the rules. Players must share a similar view of the range of allowable actions or the distribution of rights and duties among players, of likely consequences, and of preferences among players for alternative outcomes. Common understanding, however, does not imply equal distribution of information among community members. Some common knowledge of the institutional constraints is necessary for interdependent decision making, but participants may vary in their level of knowledge. Incentives therefore, may differ among individuals (even individuals with similar preferences) choosing within similar decision situations.
KeywordsInstitutional Theory Voter Turnout Informal Rule Electoral Institution Racial Resentment
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Tokaji, Daniel P. 2006. “The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the New Voting Rights Act.” South Carolina Law Review 57(4): 689–733.Google Scholar
- 7.Turner, Edward Raymond. 1916. “Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey: 1790–1807.” Smith College Studies in History 1(4): 165–187.Google Scholar
- 9.Other studies recently have provided additional support for the Bentele and O’Brien study. See for example: Hicks, William D., Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers, and Daniel A. Smith. 2015. “A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States.” Political Research Quarterly 68(1): 18–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar