Conflict and Coercion in Dependent States
The “dependencia” tradition offers a new perspective on underdevelopment in peripheral societies. A major premise of this body of scholarship is that the pattern of socioeconomic development in dependent states is, as a result of the states’ dependence, fundamentally different from those in advanced industrial states. Recently, this tradition has begun to focus on sociopolitical distortions in dependent states. Our basic argument centers on the proposition that the conditions associated with dependence lead to civil conflict and state coercion. The interaction of these two forces leads to the emergence of the increasingly repressive and authoritarian regimes identified with many dependent states.
KeywordsPhase Diagram Dependent State Reaction Function Global Community Deterrent Effect
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