Lenin and the Siberian Peasant Insurrections

  • N. G. O. Pereira


The purpose of this chapter is to explore aspects of V. I. Lenin’s views of the peasantry; how they translated into the social and agrarian policies of the new Soviet government (Sovnarkom) during the first period of Soviet rule; and, most important, the nature of their relationship to the peasant revolts in Western Siberia during 1920 and 1921. While all the peasants of Russia presented the Bolsheviks with formidable challenges on both theoretical and practical grounds, the Siberians were particularly hard to classify and to bring into line.


Peasant Household Soviet Rule Soviet Authority Poor Peasant Peasant Uprising 
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    Soviet scholarship generally divides the Russian peasantry into 65 percent poor, 20 percent middle, and 15 percent kulak, with Siberia having proportionally more kulaks, perhaps as much as 25 percent. See N. Ia. Gushchin and V. A. Il’inykh, Klassovaia bor’ba v sibirskoi derevne 1920-e—seredina 1930-kh gg. (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1987), p. 32. ButGoogle Scholar
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© Galya Diment and Yuri Slezkine 1993

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  • N. G. O. Pereira

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