Greek Deterrence Strategy

  • Athanassios G. Platias
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


Traditionally, ‘military strategy’ has referred to the planning and employment of military resources to win major campaigns against a foe or to achieve victory in war itself.1 Today the traditional emphasis in military victory is insufficient. Military strategy should be viewed not only as a narrow guide to combat activities, but as a guide to achieving security objectives in a broader sense.2 As Basil Liddell Hart has noted, ‘It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’ definition of war as “a continuation of policy by other means” — the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind.’3 It follows that deterrence, that is the prevention of war, is directly related to military strategy.


Small State Military Expenditure North Atlantic Treaty Organization Territorial Water Aegean Island 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See, among others, Edward Luttwalk, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1972), 366.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    For an analysis of asymmetrical deterrence, see Athanassios Platias, ‘Asymmetrical deterrence’, in Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite, eds, Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge (Tel Aviv: Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies, 1993), 45–62.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 13.Google Scholar
  7. See also Edward Luttwalk, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from first Century AD to the Third (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976);Google Scholar
  8. Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991);Google Scholar
  9. and Charalambos Papasotiriou, Byzantine Grand Strategy, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1991.Google Scholar
  10. 7.
    See Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).Google Scholar
  11. 8.
    For an extensive discussion of this point, see Athanassios Platias, High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden, PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1986.Google Scholar
  12. 10.
    See, for example, John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).Google Scholar
  13. 11.
    For an analysis in Greek, see A. G. Platias, The New International System: Realist Approach of International Relations (Athens: Papazisis, 1995).Google Scholar
  14. 12.
    For an analysis, see Government of Greece, White Paper (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Defense, 1995), 17–18.Google Scholar
  15. 13.
    For a comprehensive review of the issues that have dominated the agenda, see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1979). See also, Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek-Turkish relations 1973–1983: the view from Athens’, International Security, 9 (Spring 1985).Google Scholar
  16. 14.
    See, for example, Baskin Oran, ‘The sleeping volcano in Turco-Greek relations: the Western Thrace minority’, in Kemal Karpat, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments (Madison, Wis., 1996), 119–38.Google Scholar
  17. 21.
    For an analysis of the Turkish rearmament program, see Thanos Dokos and Nikos Protonatarios, The Military Power of Turkey: The Challenge for Greek Security (Athens: Tourikis, 1994 in Greek).Google Scholar
  18. 23.
    George Katsirdakis, ‘Military postures and doctrines of the South-East European countries’, in European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe (New York: UNIDIR, 1992), 82.Google Scholar
  19. 24.
    See, for example, Jed Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).Google Scholar
  20. 25.
    Yiannis Roubatis, The US Involvement in the Army and Politics in Greece, 1946–1967, PhD dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1980.Google Scholar
  21. 28.
    See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 168.Google Scholar
  22. 32.
    See Government of Greece, White Paper. Also Theodore Stathis, National Defense (Athens: Livanis, 1992), 47–9.Google Scholar
  23. 35.
    Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 36.Google Scholar
  24. 40.
    For an analysis, see Athanassios Platias, ‘Naval arms control in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Naval Arms Control After Gorbachev (London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992).Google Scholar
  25. 44.
    For a strategic analysis of the 1987 crisis, see A. G. Platias, ‘Greece’s strategic doctrine: in search of autonomy and deterrence’, in D. Constas, ed., The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1991), 91–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Athanassios G. Platias

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations