Counterterrorism and the Perils of Preemption Problems of Command and Control

  • David Tucker


Writing just before the attacks of September 11, military historian Jeremy Black argued that in the future what he called prophylactic wars would become necessary because the diffusion of destructive technologies would increasingly put the advanced countries at risk from devastating clandestine attack. Consequently, Black reasoned, these countries would feel compelled to act to prevent such attacks by engaging in prophylactic wars. Black proved a prophet. Published a year after the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy argued that in a world where weapons of mass destruction “can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning,” the United States would, if necessary, act preemptively “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries.”1


Special Operation Special Force Political Risk Military Operation Military Officer 
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Copyright information

© Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Tucker

There are no affiliations available

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