The fact that hegemonic powers tend to pursue their interests unilaterally and define their interests in very broad terms has been clearly developed by Jervis in the foregoing essay. But nations also have a choice in how their power should be used as well as the ability to note the possible limits on that power. The United States after World War II had a kind of influence that would have made an almost exclusive reliance on hard power a possibility, but the United States chose to use that influence to build institutions that would regularize what it and others would do. The thesis to be developed in this chapter is that the present U.S. policy preference—to act unilaterally and rely to a great extent on force to establish a new and better world order—is apt to be counterproductive in the long run.
KeywordsEurope Radar Syria Assure Turkey
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