The Economics of Secession: Empirical Evidence (Part I)

  • Milica Zarkovic Bookman

Abstract

Chapters 3 and 4 contain empirical evidence pertaining to various indicators of the economic basis of secession in the 37 seceding regions under study. Several points warrant explanation. First, the regions are grouped geographically rather than by income to retain continuity with chapter 1 and also because income statistics are not available for all regions. Second, despite the wide gaps in the primary and secondary sources available for some regions, an effort was made to piece together the existing evidence in order to enable a comparison of regions, albeit sometimes limited. The variation in data availability and collection practices in the various countries is significant, so that not all regions are included in every analysis. Third, given the organization of the book, the two empirical chapters are self-contained and may be skipped with no loss of comprehension. Indeed, the theoretical propositions of the link between economic variables and secession during the reevaluation, redefinition, and reequilibration phases of secession are explored in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

Keywords

Petroleum Cobalt Uranium Income Radium 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 3.
    There are no statistics on the industrial classification of the labor force in Bougainville. As a result, the portion of the indigenous population that works in the organized sector for wages is used as a proxy, and this has been estimated to be 8.2 percent of the population. Moreover, according to government statistics, the Bougainville mines employ 4 percent of the total wage labor force of the country (Azeem Amarshi, Kenneth Good, and Rex Mortimer, Development and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 133–4).Google Scholar
  2. 4.
    According to Griffin, Bougainvillians stand apart from the mainland insofar as they are significantly more educated than the average population, a fact attributed to the proliferation of missionary schools in the region. This has contributed to the positioning of Bougainvillians in all parts of the nation as well as in the important positions in administration, the army, and the police force (James Griffin, “Movements for Separation and Secession,” in Anthony Clunies Ross and John Langmore, eds., Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 117).Google Scholar
  3. 9.
    The Chinese government built up a secular public-school network, and the region experienced a rapid growth in student enrollment (see George Ginsburg and Michael Mathos, Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). However, the instruction in the schools was in Han, replacing Tibetan as the educational language.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 12.
    In 1977 the Northern and Eastern Provinces accounted for 7.6 percent of the entire manufacturing labor force, while they accounted for 13 percent of the total population (Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987, p. 136, Table 21).Google Scholar
  5. 14.
    The Economist, The World in Figures 1981, London: The Economist News paper, p. 190.Google Scholar
  6. In rupiahs, the local income per capita was Rp 141,000 in 1983 (M. Hadi Soesastro, “East Timor: Questions of Economic Viability,” in Hal Hill, ed., Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia Since 1970, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 213) while that of the entire state is Rp 4,332,000 (Hall Hill and Anna Weidemann, “Regional Development in Indonesia: Patterns and Issues,” in Hall Hill, ed., Unity and Diversity, p. 8, Table 1.1).Google Scholar
  7. 16.
    Agriculture is the principal economic activity of the region. In addition to rice, the region also produces maize, and its principal export crop is coffee. It has no significant natural resources and is distant from centers of economic activity. However, the second largest sector of the economy, with respect to employment, is the government sector. See J. K. Metzner, Man and Environment in Eastern Timor, Canberra: Australian National University, Development Studies Center Monograph no. 8, 1977.Google Scholar
  8. 19.
    Christine Drake, National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and Policies, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989, Appendix I, p. 272. East Timor did not share the experience of some Asian regions, where extensive missionary activity resulted in high literacy rates (such as Kerala). Instead, significant strides were taken only after 1975, when 570 primary schools were built, along with 85 junior high schools and 29 high schools, a university, and a polytechnic institute (The New York Times, October 21, 1990). According to the World Bank, the Indonesian literacy rate was 74 percent in 1989 (The World Bank, World Development Report 1991, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Table 1).Google Scholar
  9. 21.
    V.K.R.V. Rao, India’s National Income 1950–1980, New Delhi: Sage, 1983, p. 91, Table 7.1.Google Scholar
  10. 25.
    V.K.R. V. Rao, India’s National Income. Tea is one of India’s principal exports, and Assam is responsible for the production of 60 percent of the nation’s tea. It also produces 50 percent of the nation’s total petroleum output and natural gas (Government of India, India: A Reference Annual, New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983, pp. 476–77).Google Scholar
  11. 26.
    Government of India, Statistical Abstract of India, 1972, New Delhi: Central Statistical Organization, 1972.Google Scholar
  12. 30.
    Government of India, Statistical Abstract of India, 1984, New Delhi: Department of Statistics, 1984, Table 225.Google Scholar
  13. 33.
    C. H. Harvie and J. C. Kleve, The National Income of Sudan 1955156, Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1959, p. 80.Google Scholar
  14. 42.
    Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991, p. 268.Google Scholar
  15. 45.
    Illiteracy in Ethiopia is 90 percent, although there are regional and ethnic variations. The most literate and educated portion of the population is the Amhara ethnic group, which accounts for 28 percent of the population while housing 40 percent of the student body. Following this group, the Eritreans are the most educated, largely because of the influence of the Italian colonial policy. In 1972 the Eritreans, who account for 7.1 percent of the population, contained 11.7 percent of the student enrollments (Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 139).Google Scholar
  16. 51.
    There are no specific data available to the author. Secondary evidence may be used to infer that both industrial income and industrial employment in Casamance are low, since 85 percent of the country’s industry is located in the area immediately surrounding Dakar (Rita Cruise O’Brien, “Introduction,” in The Political Economy Of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979, p. 20).Google Scholar
  17. 53.
    No breakdown of literacy by administrative region is available. According to Pfeffermann, rural illiteracy throughout all of Senegal is 95 percent. Casamance is mostly rural, with 57 percent of the population living in villages of less than 500 inhabitants (Guy Pfeffermann, Industrial Labor in the Republic of Senegal, New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 12). The literacy figure for Senegal (62 percent) takes into consideration the urban areas.Google Scholar
  18. 55.
    During the 1970s, between 40 and 50 percent of Iraq’s oil production was concentrated in the Kurdish regions, while during the Iraq-Iran war, this increased to 80 percent (Christina Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984, p. 15.Google Scholar
  19. 59.
    Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development, New York: Praeger, 1991, p. 39.Google Scholar
  20. 64.
    This was estimated on the basis of the World Bank estimate of Britain’s income and the assessment of Birch, according to whom the gross domestic product per head in Northern Ireland was only 78 percent of that in the United Kingdom (Anthony Birch, Nationalism and National Integration, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 106).Google Scholar
  21. 66.
    This refers to 1961 (Sabine Wichert, Northern Ireland since 1945, London: Longman, 1991, p. 57).Google Scholar
  22. 69.
    John Firn, “Industrial Policy,” in Donald MacKay, ed., Scotland 1980: The Economics of Self-Government, Edinburgh: Q Press, 1977, p. 64.Google Scholar
  23. 71.
    Republique Françhise, Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de la Privatisation, Annuaire Statistique de la France 1986, Paris: Institute National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, 1986, p. 340.Google Scholar
  24. 72.
    Basque Provinces and Catalonia together produce a large proportion of Spain’s steel, textiles, and natural gas, and are thus considered the country’s most valuable industrial areas (Louis Snyder, Global Mini-Nationalisms: Autonomy or Independence? Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 113).Google Scholar
  25. 73.
    According to Zirakzadeh, two-thirds of Spain’s integrated steel plants are located on the Basque coast and one-third of Spain’s shipyards, trawlers, and supertankers. Over half of all steel produced in Spain is made in the Basque Provinces, as are two-thirds of all machine tools (Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, Reno: University of Nevada, 1991, p. 21).Google Scholar
  26. 74.
    Generalitat de Catalunya, Catalunya Endavant, Barcelona, 1982, p. 110.Google Scholar
  27. 82.
    Servizio Stampa Delia Giunta Regionale Delia Lombardia, La Lombardia Si Presenta: 2, La Geografia Milan: Arti Grafiche Reina, 1980, p. 6.Google Scholar
  28. 86.
    Gertrude E. Schroeder, “Nationalities and the Soviet Economy,” in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 48.Google Scholar
  29. 90.
    Wei Ding, “Yugoslavia: Costs and Benefits of Union and Interdependence of Regional Economies” Comparative Economic Studies 33, no. 4, 1991, p. 25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 91.
    This number from the World Bank refers to 1989. A comparison with the number provided from Ding may be inappropriate since taken from a different source, so the following data in dinars is provided. Slovenia: 30.391 billion dollars; Yugoslavia: 15.208 billion dinars (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statis-ticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1985. The numbers refer to constant 1984 dinars).Google Scholar
  31. 92.
    Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1990, Table 201–1. The same source applies to Croatia and Kosovo below.Google Scholar
  32. 97.
    This refers to per capita regional income in 1981 (Jovan Ilic, “Characteristics and Importance of Some Ethno-National and Political-Geographic Factors Relevant for the Possible Political-Legal Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Stanoje Ivanovic, ed., The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia, Beograd: Srbostampa, 1991.Google Scholar
  33. 100.
    The explanation for such a high proportion of income from the secondary sector is that the total income provided by the official statistics does not include income from private agriculture (which in these regions is not insignificant). Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslajive, Beograd, 1990, Table 3.3.Google Scholar
  34. 103.
    This incredibly high proportion of income from industries may be explained by the following: Kosovo has much mining, and the industrial classification provided by the Yugoslav official statistics includes mining (in dinars [constant, in thousands], the total income is 859, while that derived from industries is 388). See Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1990, Table 205–1.Google Scholar
  35. 105.
    Slovakia’s contribution to the national income is less than proportional to its population of 31 percent (Robert Dean, Nationalism and Political Changs in Eastern Europe: The Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, Monograph Series in World Affairs, no. 1, University of Denver, 1973, p. 22).Google Scholar
  36. 106.
    According to Schopflin, Transylvania “has traditionally been an underdeveloped area#x2014;this was so even when the region was part of Hungary” (George Schopflin, “Transylvania: Hungarians Under Romanian Rule,” in Stephen Borsody, ed., The Hungarians: A Divided Nation, New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988, p. 136.Google Scholar
  37. 107.
    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Nigeria, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1954, p. 398. This indicates that the income per capita of the eastern region, which at the time included South Cameroons also, was at the national average. That persisted until the exclusion of the Cameroons and the increase in the importance of petroleum.Google Scholar
  38. 108.
    At the time of independence, the southerners, including the Ibos, tended to be among the most literate peoples in Africa (see Walter Schwartz, Nigeria, London: Pall Mall Press, 1968). Their high levels of education may be attributed to the extensive missionary activity in the region. The literacy rate for Nigeria refers to 1985, and thus is not strictly applicable to the period of the Biafran secession.Google Scholar
  39. 109.
    According to Epstein, the mineral production of Katanga represented almost one-half of the nation’s earnings (Howard Epstein, Revolt in the Congo 1960–64, New York: Facts on File, 1965, p. 177). This was also found by Fernand Hernan, Courrier Africain, March 4, 1960.Google Scholar
  40. 110.
    According to Gerard-Libois, 36.2 percent of the Katanga labor force was employed outside the “traditional milieu” (agriculture and small-scale household industries). See Jules Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, p. 4.Google Scholar
  41. 112.
    M. R. Sharif, Modern Economic Development of Pakistan, Dacca: Mullick Brothers, 1966, p. 306.Google Scholar
  42. 114.
    Relative to West Pakistan, East Pakistan had a lower income per capita. Indeed, per capita income as a multiple of per capita income of East Pakistan (1.00) is 1.63 for West Pakistan (and 1.27 for India). Azizur Rahman Khan and Mahabub Hossain, The Strategy of Development in Bangladesh, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 7.Google Scholar
  43. 118.
    Amina Tyabji, “The Economy,” in Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee, and Sean Chee Meow, eds., Government and Politics of Singapore, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 25.Google Scholar
  44. 123.
    See Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 188.Google Scholar
  45. 129.
    SVIMEZ, Associazione Per Lo Sviluppo Del Industria Nel Mezzogiorno, Rapporto 1990 Sull’Economia Del Mezzogiorno, Bologna: il Mulino, 1990.Google Scholar
  46. 131.
    Gertrude Schroeder, “Nationalities and the Soviet Economy,” in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 47.Google Scholar
  47. 132.
    Deutsche Bank, The Soviet Union at the Crossroads: Facts and Figures on the Soviet Republics, Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank, 1990, p. 19.Google Scholar
  48. 133.
    Z. Baletic and B. Marendic, “The Policy and System of Regional Development,” in Rikard Lang, George Macesich, and Dragan Vojnic, eds., Essays on the Political Economy of Yugoslavia, Zagreb: Informator, 1982, p. 251.Google Scholar
  49. 134.
    Henryk Flakierski, The Economic System and Income Distribution in Yugoslavia, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989.Google Scholar
  50. 135.
    Copper accounted for 70 percent of the region’s mining production (Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, p. 234.Google Scholar
  51. 137.
    Fernand Hernan, Courrier Africain, March 4, 1960, also cited in Gerard-Libois, p. 5.Google Scholar
  52. 138.
    The relationship between population characteristics and economic growth was drawn by Lucien Pye, South East Asia’s Political Systems, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.Google Scholar
  53. 139.
    Simpson describes this phenomenon in detail. In 1978 the GDP per capita of Northern Ireland was 77 percent of that of the United Kingdom, while it was 12 percent higher than that of the Republic of Ireland. John Simpson, “Economic Development: Cause and Effect in the Northern Ireland Conflict,” in John Darby, ed., Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict, Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983, pp. 94–100.Google Scholar
  54. 142.
    United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1991, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.Google Scholar
  55. 143.
    David Morawetz, Twenty-five Years of Economic Development, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.Google Scholar
  56. 144.
    Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.Google Scholar
  57. 146.
    Servizio Stampa Delia Giunta Regionale Delia Lombardia, La Lombardia Si Presenta: 2, La Geografia Milan: Arti Grafiche Reina, 1980, p. 6.Google Scholar
  58. 148.
    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Nigeria, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1954, p. 398.Google Scholar
  59. 150.
    Harold Nelson, Nigeria: A Country Study, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 162.Google Scholar
  60. 151.
    For a breakdown of the value of imports and exports that pass through the various ports of Nigeria, see Reuben Udo, Geographical Regions of Nigeria, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 61.Google Scholar
  61. 153.
    No statistics are available for Assam, where the census was prevented from occurring during the past two census years (Government of India, Statistical Abstract of India, New Delhi: Department of Statistics, 1984, Table 225).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Milica Zarkovic Bookman 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Milica Zarkovic Bookman

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations