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Culture and Warfare

  • Robert E. Harkavy
  • Stephanie G. Neuman

Abstract

When we read about recent wars in distant places we are often struck by how differently foreign armies perform and the surprising ways in which hostilities end or do not end. During the 1982 episode in the serial Lebanon war, for example, regular Palestinian fighters gave a generally poor performance on the battlefield, shying away from head-on clashes, surrendering quickly, and breaking down easily under interrogation. Only militia in the refugee camps—when defending their homes and their families—displayed tenacity and resistance. In contrast, the Israeli army displayed aggressiveness and innovation on the battlefield. It not only prevailed over the Palestinians but operationally, tactically, and logistically out-fought the Syrian air force and air defense system.

Keywords

Cultural Relativist Israeli Army Military Doctrine Military Performance Military Planner 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert E. Harkavy
  • Stephanie G. Neuman

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