How the Conventional Wars Are Fought: Strategies, Doctrines, Tactics, Weapons

  • Robert E. Harkavy
  • Stephanie G. Neuman

Abstract

Having discussed the manner in which the wars have begun (war aims and openings); their geographical settings; and the basic power capabilities of the various contenders, we may now look at how the wars have actually been fought. This concerns strategies, weapons, and tactics as well as leadership, morale, and other “human factors.” For a basic outline, we return to the matrix or guide set forth in our opening chapter, which crossreferenced types of wars—all-out conventional, limited conventional, insurgency or guerilla warfare, low-intensity conflicts, etc.—to the various levels of analysis, running from the broader aspects of grand strategy to small-unit tactics and use of weaponry.

Keywords

Income Schizophrenia Syria Diesel Beach 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert E. Harkavy
  • Stephanie G. Neuman

There are no affiliations available

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