Advertisement

The Ethico-Political Ambiguity of Kantian Freedom

  • Antonio Franceschet

Abstract

Human freedom is at the core of Kant’s thought. We cannot adequately explain any particular aspect of his legacy without ultimately viewing it in relation to this concept—what Kant claims is the “keystone” of his critical philosophy. The present chapter reconstructs and interprets the central place of freedom in shaping Kant’s theory of justice and thereby develops a conceptual framework. This framework will explain the place of sovereignty in Kant’s vision of justice. It is because freedom is the ground, and therefore the justification, for Kant’s vision of political reform that this mode of analysis is justified.

Keywords

Political World Political Reform Categorical Imperative Phenomenal World Negative Freedom 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 2.
    Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 121, 131.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    See for example John Gray, “Introduction,” in Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, ed. Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray (London: The Arnione Press, 1984), 5.Google Scholar
  3. 6.
    Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 14–17.Google Scholar
  4. 8.
    Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 68.Google Scholar
  5. 10.
    Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 174Google Scholar
  6. see also Otfried Höffe, “Even a Nation of Devils Needs the State: the Dilemma of Natural Justice,” in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992), 128.Google Scholar
  7. 14.
    See Thomas W Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice,” Kant-Studien 79, 4 (1988): 409f.Google Scholar
  8. 18.
    Again these terms bear a surface resemblance to those used by Berlin. Few have done more to clarify the different ways in which Kant speaks of freedom than Lewis White Beck, “Kant’s Two Concepts of the Will in Their Political Context,” in Kant and Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 38–49.Google Scholar
  9. 23.
    Bernard Carnois, The Coherence of Kant’s Doctrine of Freedom, trans. David Booth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 47.Google Scholar
  10. 29.
    G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 89.Google Scholar
  11. 32.
    also William Galston, “What Is Living and What Is Dead in Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” in Kant and Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 214.Google Scholar
  12. 33.
    Leslie Arthur Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 3.Google Scholar
  13. 40.
    Allen D. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 10Google Scholar
  14. 45.
    See Pierre Laberge, “Kant on Justice and the Law of Nations,” in International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 87.Google Scholar
  15. 47.
    For Rousseau’s formulation of freedom, see The Social Contract, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman’s Library, 1986), 195–196.Google Scholar
  16. 66.
    Patrick Riley, “Elements of Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” in Kant and Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 20.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Antonio Franceschet 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antonio Franceschet

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations