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The Rational-Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory

  • Vesna Danilovic
Part of the Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis book series (AFPA)

Abstract

It is commonly assumed that the validity of any theory should be judged against some or all of the following requirements and evaluating criteria: (1) descriptive accuracy; (2) internal logical coherence; and (3) predictive accuracy. In the rational-cognitive debate in international relations, cognitive psychologists tend to stress the importance of descriptive accuracy, while rational choice theorists emphasize the internal logical coherence and high predictive power. These different views correspond to the commonly shared beliefs about the relative performance of the two approaches. It is generally believed that cognitive approaches outperform rational choice in their empirical descriptions, while the rational choice theory tends to be more successful in meeting the other two requirements.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Rational Choice Hard Core Rational Choice Theory Cognitive Approach 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Alex Mintz 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vesna Danilovic

There are no affiliations available

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