South Asian Nuclear Dynamics and the Nuclear Posture Review

  • Stephen Burgess
Part of the Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies book series (ISSIP)


The 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) made an impact on both India and Pakistan, the South Asian subcontinent’s two nuclear weapons states. As the following analysis shows, the changes in U.S. policy that the NPR expresses have brought about changes in the relationship of the United States with India and Pakistan and in the behavior of each of South Asia’s major powers toward one another. On the one hand, the U.S. stance, as described in the NPR, almost automatically ends discussions that urge India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear weapons programs. On the other hand, the new U.S. policy establishes a framework that can encourage greater responsibility and accountability with the recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states. In some connections, this changed global nuclear policy situation has already improved the prospects for a peaceable South Asia.


Nuclear Weapon Bush Administration Ballistic Missile Congress Party Nuclear Disarmament 
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© James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen 2005

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  • Stephen Burgess

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