The Islamist Revolt

  • Barry Rubin


During the 1990s, Egyptian Islamists—especially the older al-Jihad and the Islamic Group (IG) which emerged from the Jam’iyat movement— staged a revolutionary war against the regime which peaked during the decade’s first half and declined thereafter. They were defeated for a variety of reasons including the government’s clever, multilayered strategy; the strength of the regime’s institutions and the security agencies’ loyalty; the lack of popular support for the radicals; and divisions among the insurgent groups.


Popular Support Female Circumcision Armed Attack Muslim Brotherhood Islamist Movement 
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Notes and References

  1. 30.
    Daniel Brumberg, “Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements and Democracy in the Middle East,” in Martin Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 1997), p. 23.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Barry Rubin 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Barry Rubin

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