The Press, the Public, and the Two Presidencies of George W. Bush

  • David M. Rankin


President George W. Bush received a historic rally in American public support following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The opinion rally was so unprecedented that it took over two years for President Bush’s approval rating to finally descend back to pre-9/11 levels. The media, in particular, played a critical role in rallying public opinion around President Bush, the administration’s leadership and policy agenda.


Foreign Policy Media Coverage News Story American Political Science Review Bush Presidency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Jon Kraus, Kevin J. McMahon, and David M. Rankin 2004

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  • David M. Rankin

There are no affiliations available

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