Abstract
When Harry S. Truman left the Oval Office in January 1953, nuclear weapons were America’s first line of defense. This dependence on nuclear weapons was not intended and was not a foregone conclusion with the coming of either the cold war or the nuclear age. Rather, it was the logical outcome of Truman’s policies and practices since the first nuclear explosion in the summer of 1945.
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Notes
Colin McInnes, “Nuclear Strategy,” in Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield (eds.), Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 146.
See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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© 1993 Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Steven L. Rearden
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Williamson, S.R., Rearden, S.L. (1993). Conclusion. In: The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1953. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-05882-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-05882-9_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-60676-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-05882-9
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