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SAC and the Anglo-American Connection

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
  • Steven L. Rearden
Part of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History book series (WOOROO)

Abstract

The Korean re-armament was a multibillion-dollar effort, the first of its kind in the “peacetime” history of the United States. Not only did it more than treble the size of the American defense budget, but also it earmarked substantial additional funds for foreign military assistance, anti-Soviet propaganda on an unprecedented scale, and stepped-up covert operations. NSC 68 had posited that a major objective of the defense buildup was less American dependence on nuclear weapons. But, as we have already seen, the costs and other consequences of such a policy appeared, or so it seemed, both prohibitive and beyond the willingness of American decision-makers to risk. Thus, by 1952, a curtailment of the re-armament program gradually began, with conventional forces the most immediately affected. Once more, strategic air power and nuclear weapons became the bulwark of American and Western defenses.

Keywords

Nuclear Weapon Defense Posture Military Assistance Conventional Force Nuclear Capability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 2.
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Copyright information

© Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Steven L. Rearden 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
    • 1
  • Steven L. Rearden
    • 2
  1. 1.SewaneeUSA
  2. 2.USA

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