Re-arming for the Cold War

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
  • Steven L. Rearden
Part of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History book series (WOOROO)


As averse as Truman was to nuclear weapons in principle, his decision to develop the H-bomb clearly reflected the mindset of a pragmatist. Critics at the time were correctly concerned about where the decision would ultimately lead. But Truman had never doubted that maintaining a strong, up-to-date nuclear arsenal came first. What good it would do over the long term, or what its effective uses might be, were secondary considerations if they mattered at all. For Truman, the key issue was American nuclear superiority and its continuance for as long as possible.


National Security Nuclear Weapon Atomic Bomb Military Expenditure Military Spending 
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Copyright information

© Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Steven L. Rearden 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
    • 1
  • Steven L. Rearden
    • 2
  1. 1.SewaneeUSA
  2. 2.USA

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