The Search for Controls: Foreign and Domestic

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
  • Steven L. Rearden
Part of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History book series (WOOROO)


Within days of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan announced its surrender. The last act in a great drama had ended. What lay ahead for the victorious Grand Alliance of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be a peacemaking process as trying and difficult as any in history, one that would ultimately produce the disintegration of that alliance and help foment tensions, sometimes to the brink of war, that would persist for two generations. But the movement to that break, which became conclusive in the 1948 crisis over Berlin, would be slow and erratic. Despite differences that had arisen between East and West before the end of the war over the composition of the government in Poland, the status of lend-lease aid, the postwar treatment of Germany, and frontier adjustments in Eastern Europe and the Far East, among other issues, Truman remained hopeful through 1945, and indeed well into 1946, that an acceptable working relationship with the Soviet Union could be forged. Concurrently, however, Truman also had to cope with another problem—what to do about the atomic bomb.


Atomic Energy Atomic Weapon Atomic Bomb Manhattan Project American Policy 


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Copyright information

© Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Steven L. Rearden 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samuel R. WilliamsonJr.
    • 1
  • Steven L. Rearden
    • 2
  1. 1.SewaneeUSA
  2. 2.USA

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