Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships

  • Ronald L. Watts


This chapter draws upon the field of comparative politics to identify examples of alternative forms of political partnership. This will include an examination of the tradeoffs involved in these various alternatives, and an exploration of the differences between federation, confederation and functional intergovernmental organization as models of political partnership.


World Trade Organization Economic Integration Foreign Affair Federative Institution North American Free Trade Agreement 


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  1. 2.
    This categorization has been derived from Daniel J. Elazar (ed.), Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, 2nd ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1994), pp. xvi–xviii. See also Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, table 1, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar
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© Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman 2005

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  • Ronald L. Watts

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