“The Men Behind the Guns”

Abstract

Immense prestige accrued to the U.S. navy and thus the men of the fleet as a result of the battles of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba. “One of Dewey’s Men” was a description the sailors of the Asiatic Squadron who were present at the Battle of Manila Bay proudly attached to themselves evermore.² The Navy and the men who served in it were beneficiaries of much good will as a result of the Navy’s apparent readiness for war. This appearance of readiness was emphasized by the Army’s equally apparent lack of readiness. And, of course, the fleet victories seemed to confirm these perceptions, although later critical analysis of American gunnery at the principal battles suggested the hitting rate of the American guns was less than stellar. Objective criticism, however, was unwelcome, and even a decade after the war, when Commander William S. Sims cited the gunnery figures during Senate hearings, he was roundly condemned.

“A chain is never any stronger than its weakest link, and the men behind the guns are a very important link in the chain of defense which our Navy has linked around us.”¹