ECOMOG: A New Security Agenda in World Politics

  • David Francis


This chapter seeks to examine critically the role and contribution of a regional economic integration grouping to the understanding of the security problems of Third-World regions in the post-Cold War era and its implications for contemporary world politics. In general, it is located within the current International Relations debate concerning the role that regional organisations can play in maintaining international peace and security. The multipolar nature of the post-Cold War period and its constraints on unilateral intervention of major powers in domestic conflicts, the diversity and multiplicity of the new agendas of the so-called new world order, and the growth of globalisation have all contributed to reawaken policy and academic interest in security regionalism. At the international level, a variety of proposals have been put forward as solutions to address conflict situations in Africa, such as the American-sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative, and mercenary intervention as alternative models for international security. At the continental level a variety of home-grown strategies have been established to help resolve conflict situations in Africa. One such initiative is that of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).


Security Council Security Agendum International Peace Military Junta Mercenary Intervention 
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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Francis

There are no affiliations available

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