Abstract
In late May 1972 former President Richard M. Nixon went to Moscow and signed, among other documents, a Treaty to Limit Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems. Under this agreement, both the United States and the Soviet Union made a commitment not to build nationwide abm defenses against the other’s intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. They agreed to limit abm deployments to a maximum of two sites, with no more than 100 launchers per site. Thirteen of the treaty’s sixteen articles are intended to prevent any deviation from this. In addition, a joint Standing Consultative Commission to monitor compliance was created. “National technical means”—sophisticated monitoring devices on land, sea, and in space—were to be the primary instruments used to monitor compliance with the treaty.
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Selected Bibliography
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© 1991 Henry L. Stimson Center
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Platt, A. (1991). The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In: Krepon, M., Caldwell, D. (eds) The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04534-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04534-8_6
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