This book presents a critical examination of executive-congressional relations and the domestic politics of arms control treaty ratification within the United States during the twentieth century. The starting point of this study is the hypothesis that the politics of treaty ratification can be as important as the negotiations leading up to agreements. Benefits to international peace and security sought in years of painstaking diplomatic effort can be lost without Senate consent, as was the case with the Treaty of Versailles and the second treaty arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (salt ii). Despite the substantial importance of this subject, the politics of treaty ratification is a relatively unexplored area, particularly compared with the volumes of studies and memoirs concerning past arms control negotiations.


Executive Branch American Foreign Policy Ratification Process Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Biological Weapon Convention 


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Copyright information

© Henry L. Stimson Center 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Caldwell

There are no affiliations available

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