Abstract
Abelard, Peter (1079–1142) French: Abelard gave an account of the moral value of actions as a matter of consent to what is right or wrong. The distinction between sinning — which is actually consenting to what is wrong — and the desire to do something that is wrong is crucial to Abelard. The consent is the proper target of moral condemnation. An action itself is morally indifferent in the sense that the moral wrongfulness does not lie in the commission of the act but in one’s consent to do it. An act of killing or of taking someone’s property without authorisation to do so could be done without sin. It could be done by mistake or forced upon one. When it is not done by mistake, it is the intention, the consent to the desire to do the thing that makes it morally wrong. The individual with natural predispositions and susceptibilities that make temperance extremely difficult may find himself yielding to desires he wishes he did not have. In one respect, he is doing what he wants to do, but in another respect he is caused (by his own dispositions and passions) to act in a way contrary to how he wishes to be moved.
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© 2005 Jonathan A. Jacobs
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Jacobs, J.A. (2005). Ethics A–Z. In: Ethics A–Z. Forthcoming Volumes in the Philosophy A–Z Series. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04107-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04107-4_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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