Abstract
In this study I developed a spatial supergame model of bilateral international relations based on an interactive choice-making perspective and conducted a series of empirical tests of the most critical propositions derived from the model. Key variables in the spatial supergame model include a pair of players, critical issue dimensions, issue game structures (preferences, strategies, and non-myopic equilibria), and players’ attention dynamics. The notion of bounded rationality is viewed as the fundamental mechanism that governs the play of the spatial supergame.
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© 2006 Xinsheng Liu
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Liu, X. (2006). Conclusion. In: Modeling Bilateral International Relations. Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-03746-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-03746-6_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-73621-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-03746-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)