• Xinsheng Liu
Part of the Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis book series (AFPA)


In this study I developed a spatial supergame model of bilateral international relations based on an interactive choice-making perspective and conducted a series of empirical tests of the most critical propositions derived from the model. Key variables in the spatial supergame model include a pair of players, critical issue dimensions, issue game structures (preferences, strategies, and non-myopic equilibria), and players’ attention dynamics. The notion of bounded rationality is viewed as the fundamental mechanism that governs the play of the spatial supergame.


Foreign Policy Rational Choice Bilateral Relation Issue Dimension Issue Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Xinsheng Liu 2006

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  • Xinsheng Liu

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