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Prologues

  • Malte Zierenberg
Part of the Worlds of Consumption book series (WC)

Abstract

The history of Berlin’s wartime and postwar black marketeering formed a relatively distinct period with its own characteristics, but it did not represent a break with the prewar period. A line of tradition reached back to World War I and included the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression, and Nazi Germany’s rearmament economy. In the face of recurring chaotic economic conditions, a sustained discussion about correct moral behavior in the marketplace occurred that mattered to black marketeers and government officials alike. Likewise, the subsequent histories of traders such as Martha Rebbien did not merely repeat a well-known plot from World War I, when Berlin women used all available means to organize their everyday lives around obtaining enough food and fuel to keep their “home fires burning.”1 Rather, the histories of black marketeers like Rebbien presented sequels that referred back to such experiences and the political discussions accompanying them while at the same time manifesting new situations, new experiences, and discourses. One can understand these sequels only if one knows what came before.

Keywords

Political Culture Black Market Illegal Trading Consumption Space Street Trading 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Belinda Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000).Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    In light of such sentences, it is problematic to speak of “peccadilloes” as Mark Spoerer does in “Die soziale Differenzierung der ausländischen Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangenen und Häftlinge im Deutschen Reich,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zeite Weltkrieg, vol. 9, pt. 2, Die deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945: Ausbeutung, Deutungen, Ausgrenzung, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Munich, 2005), 562. The fact that not even close to all cases could be prosecuted does not belie the rigorous sentencing policy. In the trials before the Berlin Special Court, jail terms were the rule, and the death penalty was imposed in some cases. For examples of the latter for “War Economy Crimes,” see LAB, A, Rep. 358–02, 89703, 89770, and 87805. Spoerer’s broad generalization that “the German authorities” allowed black marketeers to be active “as long as the business transactions only served [their] personal needs” is incorrect. For some examples from the Cologne Special Court, see Malte Zierenberg, “Zwischen Herrschaftsfragen und Verbraucherinteressen: ‘Kriegswirtschaftsverbrechen’ vor dem Sondergericht Köln im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Geschichte in Köln 50 (2003): 175–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 4.
    One must take chronology into account (which Spoerer does not). As Mark Thornton observes in The Economics of Prohibition (Salt Lake City, 1991), 75–77, prohibition can at first be efficient because it is relatively easy to apply the appropriate sanctions to a weakly developed market structure with few participants. As prohibition continues, however, costs increase and the efficiency of sanctions decreases in proportion to the development of alternative market infrastructures and increasing numbers of participants. The result: “The marginal cost of increased prohibition … increases.” Ibid., 77.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936, trans. Jürgen Peter Krause and Jörg W. Rademacher, 4th ed. (Stuttgart, 1998), 663–744. On the Machtübergabe, “transfer of power,” see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 4, Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914–1949 (Munich, 2003), 580–85. On the history of the NSDAP’s rise in general,Google Scholar
  5. see Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London, 2003).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Gottfried Feder, Das Programm der NSDAP und seine weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken, 13th ed. (Munich, 1930), 9.Google Scholar
  7. 10.
    Quoted in Cornelia Schmitz-Berning , Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 1998), 671.Google Scholar
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    Bajohr notes aptly that “the harshest critics of the Weimar Republic’s alleged fat-cat economy [Bonzenwirtschaft] … established a real fat cat economy to a theretofore unknown degree”; see Frank Bajohr, Parvenüs und Profiteure 49–97, quote 67. For the debates over Berlin’s corruption cases, see Cordula Ludwig, Korruption und Nationalsozialismus in Berlin 1924–1934 (Berlin, 1998).Google Scholar
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    See, however, the modifications to the crisis paradigm in Moritz Föllmer and Rüdiger Graf, Die “Krise” der Weimarer Republik: Zur Kritik eines Deutungsmusters (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).Google Scholar
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    See, for example, Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, “Identitäts- und Konsensprobleme in einer fragmentierten Gesellschaft: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik,” in Politische Kultur in Deutschland, ed. Dirk BergSchlosser and Jakob Schissler, special issue of Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18 (1987): 80–95;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. and Andreas Wirsching, Die Weimarer Republik. Politik und Gesellschaft (Munich, 2000), 84–95.Google Scholar
  12. Thomas Mergel notes in Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf, 2002), 27–29, that fragmented societies were more the rule than the exception in Europe before 1945;Google Scholar
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    Martin H. Geyer, Verkehrte Welt: Revolution, Inflation und Moderne, Munich 1914– 1924 (Göttingen, 1998), 396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    For the basic outlines of this interpretation, see Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 13–25, 213–42. On the differences compared to the situation in 1949,Google Scholar
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    See Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Einleitung: Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit,” and Thomas Mergel, “Führer, Volksgemeinschaft und Maschine: Politische Erwartungsstrukturen in der Weimarer Republik und dem Nationalsozialismus 1918–1936,” both in Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1936, ed. Wolfgang Hartwig, 7–22, 91–128 (Göttingen, 2005).Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    See Stefan Malinowski, “Politische Skandale als Zerrspiegel der Demokratie: Die Fälle Barmat und Sklarek im Kalkül der Weimarer Rechten,” Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 5 (1996): 46–65;Google Scholar
  19. and Frank Bösch, “Historische Skandalforschung als Schnittstelle zwischen Medien-, Kommunikantions- und Geschichtswissenschaft,” in Die Medien der Geschichte: Historizität und Medialität in interdisziplinärer Perspektive, ed. Fabio Crivellari, Kay Kirchmann, Marcus Sandl, and Rudolf Schlögl, 445–64 (Konstanz, 2004). On the sequels to such forms of political instrumentalization in the two German dictatorships,Google Scholar
  20. see Martin Sabrow, ed., Skandal und Diktatur: Formen öffentlicher Empörung im NS-Staat und in der DDR (Göttingen, 2004).Google Scholar
  21. 24.
    On the “legal uncertainty in the bourgeois legal relationships,” see ibid., 209; and the introduction to Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (Berkeley, 2001), 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 25.
    Geyer, Verkehrte Welt, 383; see also Martin Geyer, “Die Sprache des Rechts, die Sprache des Antisemitismus: ‘Wucher’ und soziale Ordnungsvorstellungen im Kaiserreich und der Weimarer Republik,” in Europäische Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift für Professor Schieder, ed. Christoph Dipper, Lutz Klinkhammer, and Alexander Nützenadel, 413–29 (Berlin, 2000).Google Scholar
  23. 27.
    Robert Scholtz, “Die Auswirkungen der Inflation auf das Sozial- und Wohlfahrtswesen der neuen Stadtgemeinde Berlin,” in Konsequenzen der Inflation, ed. Gerald Feldman and J. Th. M. Houwink ten Cate, 45–75 (Berlin, 1989). For a contemporary description,Google Scholar
  24. see Gustav Böß, Die Not in Berlin: Tatsachen und Zahlen (Berlin, 1923).Google Scholar
  25. 29.
    Ibid., 64–65; Molly Loberg, “Berlin Streets: Politics, Commerce, and Crowds, 1918–1938” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2006).Google Scholar
  26. 31.
    Detlev J. K. Peukert, Volksgenossen und Gemeinschaftsfremde: Anpassung, Ausmerze und Aufbegehren unter dem Nationalsozialismus (Opladen, 1982), 233.Google Scholar
  27. See Geyer, Verkehrte Welt, 396, on the Nazis’ völkisch (national and racialist) strategy to commingle “extortion,” “Versailles,” the 1918 revolution, and anti-Semitic sentiments in their propaganda. Anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews as “extortionists” and as disturbers of the public order could, however, also be found in Social Democratic magazines; see Julia Schäfer, Vermessen—gezeichnet—verlacht: Judenbilder in populären Zeitschriften 1918–1933 (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).Google Scholar
  28. 34.
    Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Kultur der Niederlage (Berlin, 2001).Google Scholar
  29. 35.
    In this regard, Geyer, Verkehrte Welt, analyzes the hyperinflation as the devaluation of a medium of communication, which complicated social action. For a similar argument, see Hansjörg Siegenthaler, Regelvertrauen, Prosperität und Krisen: Die Ungleichmäßigkeit wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Entwicklungen als Ergebnis individuellen Handelns (Tübingen, 1993), 16;Google Scholar
  30. Siegenthaler sees the economic crisis as a catalyst for communicative processes of self-analysis. Regarding Versailles, see Gerhard Krumeich, ed., Versailles 1919: Ziele—Wirkung— Wahrnehmung (Essen, 2001);Google Scholar
  31. Manfred Franz Boemeke, ed., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge, UK, 1998);Google Scholar
  32. and Eberhard Kolb, Der Friede von Versailles (Munich, 2005). On the “weight of the past,”Google Scholar
  33. see Ulrich Heinemann, “Die Last der Vergangenheit. Zur politischen Bedeutung der Kriegsschuld- und Dolchstoßdiskussion,” in Die Weimarer Republik 1918– 1933. Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, ed. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 371–86 (Düsseldorf, 1987), 371.Google Scholar
  34. Speaking with absolute certainty has been interpreted as a rhetorically vital feature in what was actually an insecure society and was perhaps most strongly present in the stab-in-the-back legend; see Boris Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1933 (Düsseldorf, 2003).Google Scholar
  35. 37.
    Gottfried Niedhardt, “Der Erste Weltkrieg: Von der Gewalt im Krieg zu den Konflikten im Frieden,” in Wie Kriege enden: Wege zum Frieden von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Bernd Wegner (Paderborn, 2002), 205.Google Scholar
  36. 38.
    Adolf Weber, Reparationen, Youngplan, Volkswirtschaft (Berlin, 1929), 9.Google Scholar
  37. 42.
    Such economic terms formed an essential strand of the anti-Semitic discourse, which included talk of the “stock market Jews,” “the bank Jews,” and “the money Jews”; Othmar Plöckinger, Reden um die Macht? Wirkung und Strategie der Reden Adolf Hitlers im Wahlkampf zu den Reichstagswahlen am 6. November 1932 (Vienna, 1999), 115.Google Scholar
  38. 43.
    Hanne Bergius, “Berlin als Hure Babylon,” in Die Metropole: Industriestruktur in Berlin im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Jochen Boberg (Munich, 1988), 82.Google Scholar
  39. 45.
    Hanne Bergius, “Berlin als Hure Babylon,” 107–108. See also Katharina von Ankum, ed., Women in the Metropolis: Gender and Modernity in Weimar Culture (Berkeley, CA, 1997).Google Scholar
  40. 47.
    Nevertheless, encounters with the criminal milieu remained problematic and had to be brought about by “fate”—for example, love for a weak, young girl. In the end, everything had to come out all right. See, for instance, the informative plot of the film Asphalt, directed by Joe May, which played in the movie houses in 1929. Already the film poster made clear what was involved: the young protagonist was exposed to the dangers of the modern asphalt city, Berlin. The poster, in blue and gray, showed the lettering “ASPHALT” on a slanted surface, smooth as glass, as the letters themselves start to slip and slide. See Gottfried Korff and Reinhard Rürup, eds., Berlin, Berlin: Die Ausstellung zur Geschichte der Stadt (Berlin, 1987), 471–73, which includes revealing set designs.Google Scholar
  41. 48.
    On the image of the criminal in media, see Sheila Brown, Crime and Law in Media Culture (Buckingham, 2003).Google Scholar
  42. 53.
    This desire also appeared, in a weaker form, in academic discourses, for example, in economics. In the contemporary discussion of Joseph Schumpeter’s Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1911), at the center of which stands the capitalist entrepreneur as the agent of “new combinations” and thus the source of economic development, Walter Eucken asked if there had been enough entrepreneurs since 1918 who “possessed the will and the ability to be leaders of the [economic] development.” Even though Eucken answered yes, his formulation of the question in this manner pointed out how skeptical many were, and how many saw the search for personalities capable of making decisions as a manifestation of a comprehensive crisis. Furthermore, Eucken saw the cause of the crisis in the “state-societal organization,” thus implicitly shifting the “leadership” problem into the realm of the political. See Walter Eucken, “Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krise des Kapitalismus,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 36 (1932): 298.Google Scholar
  43. Dieter Haselbach, “Die Lehren aus Weimar in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften nach 1945: Der Ordoliberalismus,” in Weimars lange Schatten Weimars Lange Schatten: “Weimar” als Argument nach 1945, ed. Christoph Gusy, 118–47 (Baden-Baden, 2003), might impute to the economist too much of a critical distance when he suggests that Eucken’s argumentation was based on long-term developments and scarcely made reference to the Weimar period. At the very least, Eucken’s word choices evinced a semantic alignment with the contemporary discourse of crisis, despite his having criticized widespread faith in the “total state” and only for this reason finding himself strictly opposed to National Socialist ideas about “leadership.” See Haselbach, 125–26, and on the proximity of his ideas to those of Carl Schmitt, 129–30.Google Scholar
  44. 54.
    Quoted in Christian Schottmann, Politische Schlagwörter in Deutschland zwischen 1929 und 1934 (Stuttgart, 1997), 514.Google Scholar
  45. 57.
    Ian Kershaw, Hitlers Macht: Das Profil der NS-Herrschaft (Munich, 2000), 248.Google Scholar
  46. 60.
    It therefore seems questionable to speak in this context of an “accommodating dictatorship,” as Götz Aly does in Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 2005), even independently of the transfers that were actually provided.Google Scholar
  47. 61.
    Ian Kershaw, Der Hitler-Mythos: Führerkult und Volksmeinung (Stuttgart, 1999);Google Scholar
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  49. 62.
    On the difference between trust and hope, see Harald Wenzel, “Vertrauen und die Integration moderner Gesellschaften,” in Politisches Vertrauen: Grundlagen reflexiver Kooperation, ed. Rainer Schmalz-Bruns and Reinhard Zintl, 61–76 (Baden-Baden, 2002). On Hitler’s special position, which was not affected by the criticism of “fat cats,” see Bajohr, Parvenüs und Profititeure, 180, who quotes the Berlin Police President chief of police: “In this context, the population refers continually to the modest and reserved demeanor of the Führer.”Google Scholar
  50. 63.
    Ute Frevert, “Vertrauen in historischer Perspektive,” in Politisches Vertrauen: Soziale Grundlagen reflexiver Kooperation, ed. Rainer Schmalz-Bruns and Reinhard Zintl (Baden-Baden, 2002), 54–55.Google Scholar
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    Victor Klemperer, LTI: Notizbuch eines Philologen (Leipzig, 1999), 129.Google Scholar
  52. 67.
    Mergel, “Führer, Volksgemeinschaft und Maschine,” 126, points to examples from everyday usage, such as when renters and landlords were described as a housing community. Since the German Jurists’ Conference in 1936, lawyers were supposed to bear the title Guardian of the Law (Rechtswahrer). This change was “the expression of a complete metamorphosis,” claimed the state secretary in the German justice ministry, Roland Freisler: “Rechtswahrer… the very word suggests someone who is deployed for a special task, and this special task, this occupation, is to guard the law. And whoever calls himself a Rechtswahrer is thus also taking an oath to actually fulfill this task”; Roland Freisler, Nationalsozialistisches Recht und Rechtsdenken (Berlin, 1938), 86–88.Google Scholar
  53. 68.
    This shift also found expression in a preference for partnerships over incorporation. To be sure, the original ideological radicalism gave way after 1939 to second thoughts about the configuration of a so-called volkstümliche GmbH or “racial inc.” All in all, however, the partnership remained “the preferred legal form in the National Socialist economy”; see Matthias Stupp, GmbH-Recht im Nationalsozialismus: Anschauungen des Nationalsozialismus zur Haftungsbeschränkung, Juristischen Person, Kapitalgesellschaft und Treupflicht: Untersuchungen zum Referentenentwurf 1939 zu einem neuen GmbH-Gesetz (Berlin, 2002), 350.Google Scholar
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  55. 70.
    Uwe Spiekermann, “From Neighbour to Consumer: The Transformation of Retailer-Consumer Relationships in Twentieth-Century Germany,” in The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World, ed. Frank Trentmann, 147–74 (Oxford, 2006).Google Scholar
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    David Clay Large, Berlin: A Modern History (New York, 2001), 48–50. On the history of department stores in Imperial Germany, see Hans-Peter Ullmann, “ ‘Der Kaiser bei Wertheim’—Warenhäuser im wilhelminischen Deutschland,” in Europäische Sozialgeschichte, ed. Christoph Dipper, Lutz Klinkhammer, and Alexander Nützenadel, 223–36.Google Scholar
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  58. 74.
    For an impressive description of a “flying” exchange at the Volksbühne in the center of Berlin, see Joseph Roth’s report, “Der Orient in der Hirtenstraße: Besuch in der fliegenden Börse,” reprinted in Joseph Roth in Berlin: Ein Lesebuch für Spaziergänger, ed. Michael Bienert (Cologne, 1996). There is also a photograph here, p. 84, from 1934 of the hustle and bustle of the marketplace in the Grenadierstrasse (Scheunenviertel).Google Scholar
  59. 75.
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    See the urban renewal program for the capital developed by Albert Speer for the Generalbauinspektor (GBI) für die Reichshauptstadt„ which was accelerated in 1937. At first, it was supposed to be carried out without any financial constraints. By 1941, however, it had become increasingly problematic because of labor and material shortages. The actual expenditures of the GBI never reached the amount planned. See Harald Engler, Die Finanzierung der Reichshauptstadt: Untersuchungen zu den hauptstadtbedingten staatlichen Ausgaben Preußens und des Deutschen Reiches in Berlin vom Kaiserreich bis zum Dritten Reich (1871–1945) (Berlin, 2004), 387–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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