Game Theory: An Overview

  • Pierluigi Argoneto
  • Paolo Renna


The goal of this chapter is to give a brief overview about Game Theory and, specifically, about Game Theory concepts and tools. Due to the need of short explanations, all proofs will be omitted, and we will focus only on the intuition behind the reported results. The concepts described in this chapter are used to develop the coalition approaches proposed in this book. The results of the concepts and methodologies discussed in this chapter are integrated with negotiation and production planning activities in order to support the coalition activities.


Game Theory Cooperative Game Solution Concept Pareto Frontier Coalition Structure 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited  2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Basilicata, DIFAPotenzaItaly

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