Fault Tree Analysis

  • Marko Čepin


The fault tree analysis is a standard method for improvement of reliability, which is applied in various sectors, such as nuclear industry, air and space industry, electrical industry, chemical industry, railway industry, transport, software reliability, and insurance. The fault tree analysis is described in a way of the procedure for application together with small practical examples. The development of the fault trees and their qualitative and quantitative evaluation is presented. The illustrative examples for the application of the importance measures, such as Fussel?Vesely importance, risk achievement worth, risk reduction worth, and Birnbaum importance, are given. The applications of the fault tree analysis are mentioned, and a comprehensive list of related references is given.


Failure Probability Basic Event Fault Tree Test Interval Fault Tree Analysis 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited  2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Electrical EngineeringUniversity of LjubljanaLjubljanaSlovenia

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