Quantifying the safety degradation that an external initiator induces upon a complex facility

  • Julian P. Argirov
Conference paper


if something goes wrong with an operating complex facility, a set of its systems should be reconfigured quickly. The activation of an idle system urges some active components to make a number of predefined state transitions first. (This requires a number of items that support the proper operation of demanding active component to be in service). Then every front line system can experience more reconfigurations. The sequence of configurations that any system follows, during a specific transient, is difficult to predict since the configurations it visits, depend on the rate of change of process variables and several other things. The probability for more than a single damage within the whole set of items, which a given front-line component relies on, is actually zero if the local environment is not hazardous.


Hazardous Environment Random Failure Dynamic Reliability Single Damage Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Julian P. Argirov
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear EnergySofiaBulgaria

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