Safety Analysis according to IEC 61508 — Putting it into Practice
Since its finalisation in 2000, IEC 61508  has become very popular and its publication represents a major step forward. When implementing this safety standard, however, the user is faced with a number of challenges and ambiguities, which are already under consideration by maintenance teams within the IEC, namely the absence of a harmonised approach to risk analysis, confusion due to the existence of two different operation modes and the verification of the underlying modelling assumptions for quantitative safety integrity analysis. This paper discusses these issues and provides suggestions for their rectification.
KeywordsRepair Rate Inspection Time Target Measure Harmonise Approach Safety Integrity
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Braband, J.: Allocation of Safety Integrity Requirements for Railway Signalling Applications, in: Schueller, G. I. und Kafka, P. (Hrsg.): Safety and Reliability, ESREL’99, Balkema, Rotterdam, 1237-1242Google Scholar
- 2.Braband, J.: A Practical Guide to Safety Analysis Methods, Railway Signalling + Telecommunication, no. 9, 2001, 41–45Google Scholar
- 4.Kato, E. and Sato, Y.: Safety Integrity Level Models for IEC 61508 — Examination of modes of operation, IEEE Trans. Fundamentals, vol. E83-A, May 2000, 863–865Google Scholar
- 5.Villemeur, A.: Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety Assessment, Volume 1: Methods and Techniques, Wiley, 1992Google Scholar
- 6.IEC 61508, Functional safety of electricalIelectronicIprogrammable electronic safety-related systems, 2000Google Scholar
- 7.IEC 61703, Mathematical expressions for reliability, availability, maintainability and maintenance support terms, 2002Google Scholar