Issues Related To Safety Culture
The concept of safety culture has received significant attention ever since the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) highlighted the importance of management and organizational factors to the safety of nuclear power operation. The concept of safety culture encompasses a broad spectrum of characteristics that include personnel attitudes, the control of work activities, and organizational structures. Although safety culture means different things to different people, a working definition of the term has been provided by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Reference 1). In INSAG’s view, safety culture is “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” In a Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations (Reference 2), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) proposed a similar definition.
KeywordsNuclear Power Plant International Atomic Energy Agency Safety Culture Safety Performance Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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