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Accounting for Evidence: Managing Evidence for Goal Based Software Safety Standards

  • Vivien Hamilton
Conference paper

Abstract

Goal-based safety standards require an evidence-based approach from suppliers and the large volume of evidence for safety assurance that is generated by a software project needs to be effectively assessed and managed. A structured safety argument needs to be created and agreed with regulators and other stakeholders early in the project lifecycle so that project processes can be designed to produce the required evidence. This safety argument needs to be abstracted in that it should define the requirements for evidence without attempting to explicitly identify the concrete evidence generated. A means of traceability between abstract requirements for evidence and concrete realization needs to be provided: an SQL database which can be hyperlinked to the argument is an efficient means of managing both the status of evidence and the traceability to the argument. The safety case is completed once the evidence has been successfully generated and assessed by an evidence report in which the assessment of limitations in evidence and counter-evidence can be effectively managed.

Keywords

Object Management Group Safety Engineer Safety Case Safety Management System Defence Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the discussions on safety arguments and insight into the SAEM provided by Dr Tim Kelly, University of York.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vivien Hamilton
    • 1
  1. 1.Viv Hamilton Associates LtdWethersfieldUK

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