Are we there yet? A Practitioner’s View of DO-178C/ED-12C

  • Dewi Daniels
Conference paper


RTCA DO-178B/EUROCAE ED-12B is the industry-accepted guidance for determining that the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment comply with airworthiness requirements. DO-178B/ED-12B, published in 1992, is being updated to DO-178C/ED-12C. Nearly six years in the making, DO- 178C/ED-12C is expected to be completed in December 2010. It will be accompanied by a new set of supplements providing additional and much-needed guidance on tool qualification, model based development and verification, objectoriented technologies, and formal methods. Written by a member of the DO-178C/ED-12C editorial team who is also a practising software developer and verifier, this paper provides a practitioner’s view of the new standard and its supplements. It explains how they will affect your organisation, focusing on the practical implications of the many changes between DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-178C/ED-12C.


Formal Method Certification Authority Software Requirement Object Code Federal Aviation Administration 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dewi Daniels
    • 1
  1. 1.Silver AtenaMalmesburyUK

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