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Are we there yet? A Practitioner’s View of DO-178C/ED-12C

  • Dewi Daniels
Conference paper

Abstract

RTCA DO-178B/EUROCAE ED-12B is the industry-accepted guidance for determining that the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment comply with airworthiness requirements. DO-178B/ED-12B, published in 1992, is being updated to DO-178C/ED-12C. Nearly six years in the making, DO- 178C/ED-12C is expected to be completed in December 2010. It will be accompanied by a new set of supplements providing additional and much-needed guidance on tool qualification, model based development and verification, objectoriented technologies, and formal methods. Written by a member of the DO-178C/ED-12C editorial team who is also a practising software developer and verifier, this paper provides a practitioner’s view of the new standard and its supplements. It explains how they will affect your organisation, focusing on the practical implications of the many changes between DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-178C/ED-12C.

Keywords

Formal Method Certification Authority Software Requirement Object Code Federal Aviation Administration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dewi Daniels
    • 1
  1. 1.Silver AtenaMalmesburyUK

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