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Human Performance and Plant Safety Performance

Establishing a Technical Basis and Framework for Evaluating New Human–System Interfaces
  • John M. O’Hara
  • J. Persensky
Conference paper

Abstract

New nuclear power plants (NPPs) employ digital instrumentation, control systems and computer-based human–system interfaces (HSIs) that possess tremendous functional capability and an ability to display information that is limited only by the imagination of the designer. Thus the industry is seeing a proliferation of approaches to information system design. A question arises as to how one should decide which approaches to use in control rooms. The purpose of this chapter is to address this question; more specifically to propose an approach to evaluating new and novel HSI in NPP and other complex human–machine systems in the context of human factors and plant safety performance. Our approach provides a decision-making context that considers the design approach as well as its products.

Keywords

Nuclear Power Plant Human Performance Secondary Task Control Room Situation Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited  2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Brookhaven National LaboratoryNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Former US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DCUSA

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