Cost-Saving Joint Venture Under Uncertainty

  • David W. K. Yeung
  • Leon A. Petrosyan
Part of the Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications book series (SDGTFA)


In this chapter, we consider a cost-saving joint venture in the presence of stochastic elements. Section 9.1 formulates a dynamic cost-saving corporate joint venture in a stochastic environment and characterizes its subgame consistent solutions. An explicitly solvable illustration is given in Sect. 9.2. A characterization of the Shapley Value solution to a stochastic cost-saving joint venture is presented in Sect. 9.3 and a payoff distribution procedure leading to a subgame consistent solution is computed. Extensions to infinite-horizon ventures are formulated with explicit illustrations in the subsequent two sections.


Joint Venture Expected Profit Grand Coalition Stochastic Control Problem Technical Appendix 
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  1. Shapley, L.S.: A value for N-person games. In: Kuhn, H.W., Tucker, A.W. (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, pp. 307–317. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1953) Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic GamesHong Kong Shue Yan UniversityHong KongPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.Center of Game TheorySt. Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia
  3. 3.Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control ProcessesSt. Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia

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