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Dynamically Stable Cost-Saving Joint Venture

  • David W. K. Yeung
  • Leon A. Petrosyan
Part of the Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications book series (SDGTFA)

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider a common economic activity involving cooperative optimization—joint venture. However, it is often observed that after a certain time of cooperation some firms in a joint venture may gain sufficient skills and technology that they would do better by breaking away from the joint operation. Analysis on time (optimal-trajectory subgame) consistent joint ventures are presented in the following sections.

Keywords

Optimal Control Problem Joint Venture Grand Coalition Consistent Solution Technical Appendix 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic GamesHong Kong Shue Yan UniversityHong KongPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.Center of Game TheorySt. Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia
  3. 3.Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control ProcessesSt. Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia

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