Fish Wars with Changing Area for a Fishery
In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors, the players (countries) harvest the fish stock on their territory.We consider power population’s growth function and logarithmic players’ profits. Both cases of finite and infinite planning horizon are investigated. The Nash and cooperative equilibria are derived. We investigate a new type of equilibrium – cooperative incentive equilibrium.Hence, the center punishes players for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium by changing the harvesting territory. A numerical illustration is carried out and results are compared.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Planning Horizon Nash Equilibrium Strategy Punishment Strategy Cooperative Equilibrium
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The research was supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research, projects 10-01-00089-a and 08-01-98801-r-sever-a.
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