The Optimal Trajectory in the Partial-Cooperative Game

  • Onik Mikaelyan
  • Rafik Khachaturyan
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 9)


This chapter investigates a partially cooperative game in an extended form. The method of finding the optimal behavior of players and the value for such games are presented. During the course of the game, auxiliary games and Nash’s equilibrium situations are considered to define the distribution between players of a coalition. An example is also presented.


Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Optimal Trajectory Cooperative Behavior Coalition Structure 
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Copyright information

© Birkhäuser Boston 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Onik Mikaelyan
    • 1
  • Rafik Khachaturyan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MechanicsYerevan State UniversityYerevanRepublic of Armenia

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