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Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements

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Advances in Dynamic Game Theory

Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 9))

Abstract

Scarcity of water has become a major issue facing many nations around the world. To improve the efficiency of water usage there has been considerable interest in recent years in trading water. A major issue in trading water rights is the problem of how an allocation system can be designed in perpetuity that also has desirable properties at each point of time. This is an issue of the time consistency of the contract to trade water. In this chapter we develop a model of dynamic recontracting of water rights and study time consistency properties of the resultant contracts using the ideas of Filar and Petrosjan [7].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics and the ARC Centre for Complex Systems, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia 4072, Queensland, Australia

    Rodney Beard & Stuart McDonald

Authors
  1. Rodney Beard
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  2. Stuart McDonald
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Business, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense, Denmark

    Steffen Jørgensen

  2. Laboratoire de Mathématiques, Université de Bretagne Occidentale, 6 Avenue Le Georgeu, 29200 Brest, France

    Marc Quincampoix

  3. Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA

    Thomas L. Vincent

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© 2007 Birkhäuser Boston

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Beard, R., McDonald, S. (2007). Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements. In: Jørgensen, S., Quincampoix, M., Vincent, T.L. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Game Theory. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 9. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_20

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