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Belief and Conviction

Part of the Cognition and Language: A Series in Psycholinguistics book series (CALS)

Abstract

Argument: Beliefs develop out of the deep self. The conceptual element is emphatic in belief, the affective element (will) in desire. Knowledge is shaped by core beliefs and valuations. Action is structured by implicit beliefs, which include experiential and world knowledge. Explicit beliefs are action equivalents of knowledge when truth judgments are required. Conviction develops in the derivation of value to a feeling of reality that accompanies the actualization of objects as facts.

Keywords

True Belief Belief State Object Knowledge World Knowledge Core Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    R. Bogdan, “The Manufacture of Belief,” in Belief, ed. R. Bogdan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 149.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Consistent with the principle that feelings are less readily “retrieved” than ideas, Brown, Self and Process, 155.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    N. Nelkin, “Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness,” Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49(1989): 413–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    See F. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    G. Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Scribner, 1923).Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    G. Moore, “Proof of an External World,” Proceedings of the British Academy 25(1939).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (London: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 42.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    See N. Malcolm, Memory and Mind (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), on how we know what we remember is accurate without a standard in memory for comparison. The pathological material argues against such a standard, suggesting that the feeling of conviction (or lack of awareness of error) is generated with the content and is not an extrinsic function of correspondence in awareness.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Henri Poincaré described the “feeling of absolute certitude” preceding a proof in “Le Raisonnement mathématique,” 1908; reprinted in The Creative Process, ed. B. Ghiselin, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    E. Swedenborg, Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell, trans. J. C. Agen (New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1940). Originally published in Latin in 1758. Regarding philosophical delusions, Schiller has written: “Those unfortunate enough to have acquired and retained an exclusive view of truth are usually secluded in prisons or asylums, unless their truth is so harmlessly abstruse as not to lead to action, when they are sometimes allowed to be philosophers!” F. Schiller, Humanism (New York: Macmillan, 1903).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    G. Strawsen, Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    M. Leon, Philosophical Papers 21(1992): 299–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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