Argument: Drive transforms to desire through the constraints of experience. This parallels the growth of a self in a subject. As drives infiltrate implicit beliefs to create core valuations, the desires are configured by the explicit beliefs to create values that are learned. The belief in a desire is its goal. The desire in a belief is its conviction and realness. Free will requires a mitigation of drive. Agency is not in the service of reason but in choice between competing options.


Sexual Desire Object Knowledge Implicit Belief Sudden Impulse Initial Valuation 
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  1. 2.
    C. Calhoun, “Cognitive Emotions?” in What Is an Emotion? ed. C. Calhoun and R. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Some of the issues in this section are discussed in P. Greenspan, “Subjective Guilt and Responsibility,” Mind 101(1991): 287–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 4.
    The explanatory linkage of belief and desire as argued in the text is essential to process theory, yet it is oddly critiqued as a “technical” objection to behaviorism by J. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 34.Google Scholar
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    J.S. Mill, On Liberty (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956).Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    R. Double, The Non-Reality of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 68.Google Scholar

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© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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