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Abstract

Argument: Freedom differs from free will in that the former is defined in relation to rational decision and extrinsic compulsion, while the latter is a private experience centered on agency and choice independent of the rationality of one’s options. Agency is a relation across contents in the same or successive mental state(s). The relation is between self and image, including the body image. Privacy is essential for the exclusivity of foreknowledge, the ability of the agent to predict his or her acts and to recollect a prior intention.

Keywords

Body Image External Object Prior State Body Schema Mental Causation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    P. Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body (New York: International Universities Press, 1950); Self and Process, 112, for discussion of the body as an intermediate object; S. Gallagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification,” Journal of Mind and Behavior 7(1986): 541–554, on the distinction of a deep or unconscious body schema and an explicit or conscious body image.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    J. Kim, “The Nonreductionist’s Trouble with Mental Causation,” and J. Hornsby, “Agency and Causal Explanation,” in Mental Causation, ed. J. Heil and A. Mele (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    On some of the various meanings of privacy in the philosophical literature, see T. Sprigge, “The Privacy of Experience,” Mind 77(1969): 512–521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 5.
    See the discussion in J. R. Lucas, The Future (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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