Argument: An object is a process of becoming actual that gives way to another object. An actualization creates temporal facts out of simultaneity or timelessness. Authentic change occurs in the becoming of the object in a mind that perceives the world. Apparent change seems to occur between existing objects in the world. Authentic change is novel or emergent. The idea of causation is inferred from apparent change as a theory on the succession of objects in the course of their replacement.


Apparent Motion Apparent Change Actual Object Solid Object Billiard Ball 
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© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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