Argument: Subjectivity and agency are generated from primitive will with engagement of the core in action development. This feeling distinguishes an action from a passive movement. Reflex is extrinsic to mind. Automatic acts are low-level cognitions that express the subjective directly. Voluntary acts express the self after a delay. There is a transition from reflex to automatism to volition. Automatic actions become volitional as part acts issue from concepts. Volitions become automatic (skilled) as acts that require partial concepts pass to part-acts that express concepts. An action incorporates distributed evolutionary systems in a phased sequence of oscillators. The sequence progresses from an axial core to a proximate grasping space to an effectuation on external objects. Orientation and initiation are prior to awareness. Time constraints of readiness potential studies conform to expectations of the model for simple volitional acts.


Mental State Basal Ganglion Motor Cortex Supplementary Motor Area External Object 
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© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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