This book is not so much an argument for the positions taken on the topics of its theme as an exploration of what those positions would be given the theme that it takes. The approach differs from the usual pick and choose applications of neuropsychological data to philosophical issues which insert clinical symptoms into philosophical arguments simply to illustrate or reinforce their claims. A symptom or deficit is snatched from its context as a fragment of defective behavior and used to strengthen an argument in which it has no authentic share. This is a fraudulent use of the clinical material.


Moral Responsibility Material World Philosophical Argument Causal Theory Mental Causation 
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    M. Solms and M. Saling, “On Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: Freud’s Attitude to the Localizationist Tradition,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 67 (1986):397–400.PubMedGoogle Scholar
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    After A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929).Google Scholar
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    The connection between time and agency was most forcefully argued in H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (1889; reprint, London: Swan, Sonnenschein, 1923).Google Scholar
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    Frankfurt’s witty discussion of de-liberation as the loss of liberty of the drives in the gaining of the autonomy of reason leads him to conclude, as do I, that “reason depends on will.” H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: U.K. Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar
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    On this point, see R. Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany, SUNY Press, 1985).Google Scholar
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    The position is that free will exists but is incompatible with universal causation. Some philosophical arguments for this view can be found in P. Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Van Inwagen bases his argument for freedom on the reality of moral responsibility. I would consider moral responsibility an outcome of a proof of the existence of free will, not an argument for it.Google Scholar
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© Plenum Press, New York 1996

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