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Improving Decisions and Judgments The Desirable versus the Feasible

  • Gideon Keren

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the conditions and the extent to which decisions and judgments can be modified, and eventually improved. Before such an assessment can be made, however, two basic questions have to be raised. An obvious underlying assumption in the present context is that decisions are not invariably perfect, and consequently do not always lead to the desired goals. The first question then concerns a metadecision question: How should one judge the quality of decisions? Is it possible to define and identify deficient and flawed decisions, and what criteria should be used in such a process? In the first part of this chapter I will briefly address one of the more fundamental (and at the same time one of the most difficult) questions in decision sciences, namely, what constitutes a good or a poor decision and how could it be measured and assessed.

Keywords

Decision Maker Decision Problem Decision Theory Organizational Behavior Normative Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gideon Keren
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyFree University of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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