Games Evolution Plays

  • Karl Sigmund


The evolution of cooperation is frequently analysed in terms of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperation is a robust phenomenon. However, the strategy which eventually gets adopted in the population seems to depend sensitively on fine details of the modelling process, so that it becomes difficult to predict the evolutionary outcome in real populations.


Evolutionary Game Theory Mutual Cooperation Mutual Defection Good Standing Human Cooperation 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karl Sigmund
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für MathematikUniversität WienViennaAustria

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