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Abstract

In addressing the question “Do representations need reality?”, this paper attempts to show that a principled understanding of representations requires that they have objective, systematic content. It is claimed that there is an interesting form of nonconceptual, intentionality which is processed by non-systematic connectionist networks and has its correctness conditions provided by a modest biosemantics; but this type of content is not properly representational. Finally, I consider the consequences that such a verdict has on eliminativist views that look to connectionism as a means of radically reconceiving our understanding of cognition.

Keywords

Proper Function Correctness Condition Representational Content Intentional Content Emphasis Mine 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel D. Hutto
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Meaning and Metaphysical StudiesUniversity of Hertfordshire, Watford CampusAldenhamEngland

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