Can a Constructivist Distinguish between Experience and Representation?
When constructivism gives up reality as a way of accounting for representations it looses a powerful tool of explanation. Why do we have the representations we have? How are they interrelated? This article investigates what possible means a constructivistic theory has to maintain the distinction between representations and experience, between memory and imagination, and between correct and mistaken perceptions. Phenomenological qualities and coherence are the solutions advocated, but how they are combined will have an impact on what sort of constructivistic theories that can be maintained.
KeywordsInternal Experience Phenomenal Quality Constructivistic Theory Privileged Access Constructivist Distinguish
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