Abstract
Three problems concerning the mutual relation of reality and representation are discussed. Although there is no direct access to reality, a structural similarity between reality and representation can be assumed. A holistic account of qualia can help to explain how this structural similarity emerges. On this account, qualia have a relational, not an intrinsic status. A proposal is made how the “explanatory gap” between the first person perspective and neurobiological theories of brain processes could be closed. While corresponding with the PDP-approach in AI, the results contradict the traditional brain/computer analogy. All in all, these considerations may help to dissolve some of the philosophical puzzles around the mind/brain relationship and demonstrate that the relevant questions can be solved by empirical research.
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Pauen, M. (1999). Reality and Representation Qualia, Computers, and the “Explanatory Gap”. In: Riegler, A., Peschl, M., von Stein, A. (eds) Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-29605-0_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-29605-0_29
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